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SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT AGENTS AND AGENT-
ATTORNEYS: DISCOURSES AND CONVENTIONS 





“Sometimes the law can‟t be foller‟d no way,” said Pa.  “Not in 
decency, anyways.  They‟s lots of time you can‟t . . . .  Sometimes a 
fella got to sift the law . . . .” 
  The preacher rose high on his elbow.  “Law changes,” he said, “but 
„got to‟s” go on.  You got the right to do what you got to do.”1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions regarding the ethical obligations, pitfalls, and dilemmas 
facing attorneys who become sports or entertainment agents are not new.  
However, despite a substantial discourse on the topic, the sense persists 
that being both a lawyer and an agent is problematic.  The applicable 
laws, including ethical regulations, seem to be clear, but are subject not 
only to law‟s usual jurisdictional variations and interpretive instability, 
but also to the mediation of conventions or tacit understandings that 
pervade the sports and entertainment industries.  Problems, therefore, 
remain that appear to require a solution. 
 
*Professor and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School of Law. 
 1. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 140 (Penguin Classics 2006) (1939). 
1
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The identifiable problems arise, in part, from the competition 
between (i) non-attorney agents, impliedly members of a profession 
governed by regulations (i.e., existing state laws and league or union 
rules regulating sports or entertainment agents) and agency law, and (ii) 
attorney-agents, who appear to cross back and forth between two 
professions.
2 
 As attorneys, attorney-agents are governed by ethical rules 
of conduct, which constitute a competitive disadvantage insofar as non-
attorney agents may impliedly solicit clients, worry less about conflicts 
of interest, and cross state boundaries without worrying about the 
unauthorized practice of law.
3
  Attorney-agents can try to regain their 
competitive edge by taking the position that they “wear two hats”—at 
times they are practicing law under the ethical rules for lawyers, and at 
other times they are acting as agents.
4
  That strategy has been 
condemned, in numerous legal ethics opinions, judicial opinions, and 
legal commentary as a misunderstanding of the scope of the rules of 
professional conduct—”all of [an attorney‟s legal and non-legal] 
services are considered to be legal services for purposes of determining 
whether a lawyer must comply with the rules.”5  Even if an attorney-
agent decides to resign from the bar (or a law school graduate decides 
not to be licensed as a lawyer), holding oneself out as a lawyer without 
being licensed constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
6
 
A solution, analogous to the alleviation of restrictions on multi-
jurisdictional practice in Model Rule 5.5,
7
  is the proposal that attorney-
agents should not be burdened by attorney ethics: 
Modifying the policy surrounding the law governing lawyers likely 
does not require much, if any, restructuring of the [Model Rules of 
 
 2. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS AGENTS 98, 
100 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2d ed.) (2008). 
 3. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT (2009), R. 1.7 (prohibiting concurrent 
conflicts of interest unless clients give informed consent), R. 5.5 (prohibiting practice in another 
jurisdiction except in narrow circumstances), and R. 7.3 (prohibiting in-person or live telephone 
solicitation if significantly motivated by pecuniary gain). 
 4. See generally SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 100-03. 
 5. State Bar of Calif., Formal Op. No. 1999-154 (1999).   
 6. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm., Op. No. 85-73 (1985) (holding that if a law 
school graduate who is not bar member lists himself as an “attorney” on membership roster of 
organization or in any publication, he would be holding himself out as an attorney in violation of 
statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law). 
 7. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 3, R. 5.5 (amending the previous prohibition against 
practice in another jurisdiction by establishing safe harbors for (i) associating with co-counsel in 
that jurisdiction, (ii) matters relating to pending litigation if the out-of-state lawyer is or will be 
authorized to appear, (iii) arbitration or mediation relating to the lawyer‟s in-state practice, and (iv) 
matters arising out of or related to the lawyer‟s in-state practice). 
2
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Professional Conduct] or the restatements.  The solution may be as 
simple as . . . an addendum letter or . . . some other written amendment 
sent . . . to each state bar association . . . .  The goal would be to have 
all states, as well as state and federal courts, begin to modify their 
existing policies to the extent that lawyers engaged in other professions 
. . . should be able to engage in conduct that is reasonably expected of 
practitioners in those professions without the fear of reprimand.
8
 
That argument is especially compelling because the author raises the 
specter of attorneys being driven out of the field of athlete and celebrity 
representation, much to the disadvantage of those clients.
9
  On the other 
hand, the author underestimates the magnitude of the recommended 
amendment of the rules, and downplays the negative aspects of the 
conventional “conduct that is reasonably expected” of agents.10  
Moreover, the concern that agents are regularly engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law, a concern that is not directly related to the 
problem of the competitive disadvantage of attorney-agents in the field 
of sports and entertainment representation (except regarding 
unauthorized practice of law by an attorney in multi-jurisdictional 
practice) should be part of any proposal to solve the problem. 
II. DISCOURSES  
A. Pedagogical Dimensions  
The fields of sports and entertainment law are now well-established 
in the curriculum at most law schools, and some law schools offer 
specialized programs in the fields.
11
  Sports law courses, societies, and 
 
 8. Jeremy Geisel, Disbarring Jerry Maguire:  How Broadly Defining “Unauthorized 
Practice of Law” Could Take the “Lawyer” Out of “Lawyer-Agent” Despite the Current State of 
Athlete Agent Legislation, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 225, 245-46 (2007). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. at 246.  The proposal to lower attorney ethical standards would unwittingly 
eliminate the protection offered to a lawyer‟s client in ABA Model Rules, R. 1.8(a) (requiring 
advice concerning the desirability of seeking the advice of independent counsel when the lawyer 
enters a business transaction with a client), which comes into play whenever a lawyer drafts a 
contract from which the lawyer will receive a percentage of the client‟s income, as long as agents 
typically do not recommend a lawyer to clients signing such contracts.  Likewise, the representation 
of multiple athletes with adverse interests, see infra note 40 and accompanying text, is a convention 
that would radically alter attorney conflict of interest rules. 
 11. For example, Duke, Florida Coastal, Georgia State, Marquette, and Tulane law schools 
offer sports law programs.  See Sports Law School Programs, SportsAgentBlog.com, 
http://www.sportsagentblog.com/links/sports-law-school-programs (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).  
Many other schools offer numerous courses related to the fields.  See Best Entertainment Law 
3
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specialized student-edited journals reflect high law student interest in the 
possibility of representing professional athletes some day.
12
  Numerous 
casebooks and supplementary materials are available to the law 
professors teaching, for example, sports law; many such professors are 
active in the Section on Law and Sports of the AALS and in other sports 
law associations and blogs.  
Introductions to law students of the ethical problems of sports law 
representation, and the tension between non-attorney agents and 
attorney-agents, vary.  One approach is reflected in Peter Carfagna‟s 
Representing the Professional Athlete (2009), which is impliedly a law 
school casebook (written by a sports attorney who teaches at Harvard 
Law School, and published in West‟s “American Casebook Series”).13  
Although it would be a superb guide for agents generally, it refers in the 
teacher‟s manual to “students,” not merely “law students,” and is 
therefore, perhaps, intended for a broader audience.
14
  In any event, the 
ethical problems and tensions between non-attorney agents and agent-
attorneys are basically ignored.
15
  Indeed, the focus is on the agent 
profession, which is very important in the training of attorney-agents, 
and not on attorneys per se.
16
  The legal relationship between the athlete-
agent and the client is defined in terms of agency and contract law, not 
in terms of attorney regulation.
17
  In the casebook‟s lengthy discussion 
of the contract between an agent and her athlete client, there is a sudden 
reference to the “agent‟s attorney” as the drafter of such contracts, which 
implies that the agent is not drafting contracts (which, as I will later 
argue, is a good idea); strangely, there is no reference to the athlete‟s 
attorney, perhaps an attorney-agent, the implied subject of the 
casebook.
18
  Then, following a comprehensive chapter on NCAA 
regulations, Carfagna devotes a long chapter to negotiation, “what 
agents spend the majority of their time doing once they have obtained 
 
Schools and Sports Law Schools, Top-Law-Schools.com, http://www.top-law-
schools.com/entertainment-law-schools.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Sports Law, SportsLinkCentral.com, http://www.sportslinkscentral.com/Sports_ 
Business/sports_law.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (listing publications and societies). 
 13. See e.g. PETER A. CARFAGNA, REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE (Thomson 
West 2009). 
 14. See PETER A. CARFAGNA, TEACHER‟S MANUAL TO REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL 
ATHLETE 1 (Thomson West 2009). 
 15. See CARFAGNA, supra note 13. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 1-7. The author also mentions regulation of agents by state legislatures, the 
NCAA, and player associations.  See id. at 7-9.  
 18. See id. at 13-14. 
4
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athlete-clients.”19  After then discussing negotiation techniques and 
strategies, Carfagna turns to drafting.  While he does not mention the 
issue of non-attorney agents who might conventionally draft contracts, 
he does refer in his conclusion to “the attorney representing the . . . 
athlete” and “[the athlete‟s] personal . . . attorney,” which suggests that 
the casebook is targeted at law students, and even that attorneys draft 
negotiated contracts and non-attorney agents do not (again, a good 
suggestion).
20
  The concluding section on drafting litigation documents 
is obviously meant for future attorney-agents, and the next chapter on 
publicity rights refers to “attorneys for celebrity athletes” as drafters of 
license agreements.
21
  The following chapter on managing the mature 
athlete includes a hypothetical, beginning, “You are the attorney/agent 
for . . . ,”22 which confirms that Carfagna is addressing law students, but 
then (in a later chapter) when discussing employment agreements 
between agents and sports agencies, Carfagna mentions that “[the] agent 
who also operates as an attorney will be constrained by the professional 
rules of responsibility governing lawyers . . . [which] may limit contracts 
and business relationships.”23  This is the clearest reference to the 
competitive tension between non-attorney agents and attorney-agents, 
and the only mention made of the alleged competitive disadvantage to 
lawyers in the field of sports representation.  No mention is made of the 
“two-hat theory” to avoid the problem, or of the question of whether 
non-attorney agents (engaged in negotiation and concomitant client 
counseling) are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
24
  Without 
criticizing the substance of Carfagna‟s book, if it was the only book law 
students read, they would not be introduced to a major discourse 
(concerning ethics) in the field of sports law.  
Most sports law casebooks, on the other hand, include a more 
comprehensive treatment of the ethical aspects and dilemmas of 
attorney-agents. For example, a leading casebook by Mitten, Davis, 
Smith, and Berry
25
 offers a section on ethical issues (including 
restrictions on lawyer solicitation and the resulting competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis non-attorney agents) that ends with a three-part 
problem that summarizes the controversies concerning non-attorney 
 
 19. See id. at 36. 
 20. See CARFAGNA, supra note 13, at 53. 
 21. See id. at 69.  
 22. Id. at 109. 
 23. Id. at 133-34. 
 24. See id. 
 25. MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH, & ROBERT C. BERRY, SPORTS 
LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (Aspen Publishers 2d ed.) (2009). 
5
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agents and attorney-agents. The first question is whether a licensed 
attorney who holds himself out as an attorney can, in a disciplinary 
action for commingling funds, disavow that he is practicing law when he 
is acting as a sports agent; the answer is no.
26
  The second question is 
whether it would help the sports agent-attorney‟s argument if he only 
represented athletes and did not identify himself as an attorney on 
business cards or solicitation letters.
27
 This presents for the students a 
harder case, because (i) an Alabama disciplinary opinion (in the 
casebook) confirmed that a sports agent who is a law school graduate, 
but not a licensed attorney, would be engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law if he listed himself as an attorney on the membership 
roster of a sports representative organization
28
  (the attorney in the 
second question did not hold himself out as an attorney), and (ii) an 
Illinois State Bar Association advisory opinion (in the casebook) 
confirmed that an attorney who handled player representation and 
practiced law from the same office is also practicing law in his role as a 
player representative
29
 (and impliedly is governed by the ethical rules for 
attorneys; but the second question involves an attorney who is only a 
sports agent with no other clients).  The fact that the attorney is licensed 
and does not hold himself out as an attorney distinguishes his case from 
the Alabama ethics opinion, which concerns the unauthorized practice of 
law by an unlicensed attorney who holds himself out as an attorney—the 
attorney in the second question is claiming not to be engaged in the 
practice of law, even though he is licensed.
30
  The fact that the attorney 
in the second question has no law practice apart from his player 
representation distinguishes his case from the Illinois ethics opinion, but 
some courts have assumed “that lawyers who acted as sports agents were 
subject to the rules of their respective bar associations.”31  (As an aside, 
the second question is therefore a superb, or at least typical, law school 
exam question.)  Because most cases of this type (and the materials in 
the casebook) involve “dual representation”—both legal and non-legal 
services provided by an attorney—the second question highlights 
whether being a sports agent necessarily involves the practice of law.  A 
 
 26. See id. at 764.  The facts of the hypothetical are based on In Matter of Horak, 224 A.D.2d 
47, 647 N.Y.S. 20 (1996). 
 27. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 764. 
 28. See Alabama opinion, supra note 6.  
 29. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 101 (citing Illinois State Bar Assoc., Op. No. 
700 (Nov. 4, 1980)). 
 30. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 764. 
 31. Id. at 763 (citing In the Matter of Frederick J. Henley, 478 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. 1996) and 
Cuyahoga County Bar Assoc. v. Glenn, 649 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio 1995)).  
6
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certified public accountant who is also practicing law is governed by the 
rules of professional conduct,
32
 as is the practicing attorney who 
provides financial advice.
33
  But there is a gap, because an agent (who 
happens to be an attorney without a law practice or law office) is 
seemingly only wearing one hat and avoiding the “dual representation” 
in the case law and legal ethics opinions.  
The third question in the casebook, for the law students reeling at 
this point, is whether a non-attorney, who “negotiated player-team 
contracts [and] endorsement deals,” is engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law,
34
 and the casebook authors suggest that courts would 
likely not find the non-attorney in violation of unauthorized practice 
statutes.
35
  That answer may be right, but I doubt that it should be the 
law. The Illinois ethics opinion, in response to an attorney‟s question 
whether he may handle player representation “from the same office in 
which he engages in the general practice of law,” remarked:  
It would appear . . . that the attorney making this inquiry questions 
whether the representation of athletes is actually the practice of law in 
that it may include a wide range of business counseling, as well as 
contract negotiation.  This doubt could be prompted by the fact that 
nonlawyers frequently engage in these activities.
36
  
However, the Illinois State Bar did not answer that question, but rather 




Another book, Kenneth Shropshire and Timothy Davis‟s The 
Business of Sports Agents,
38
 is not a casebook but is a likely candidate 
for supplementary materials in a sports law course.  The chapter entitled 
“Ethics: Attorney Versus Nonattorney Agents,” faces squarely the 
problems of dual representation, the competitive disadvantage suffered 
by attorney-agents bound by the ethical rules for attorneys, and the 
 
 32. See id. (citing In re Clinton A. Jackson, 650 A.2d 675, 677 (D.C. App. 1996) (“A lawyer 
is held to a high standard of honesty, no matter what role the lawyer is filling . . . .”). 
 33. See id. (citing In Matter of Dwight, 573 P.2d 481, 484 (Ariz. 1977) (“As long as a lawyer 
is engaged in the practice of law, he is bound by the ethical requirements of that profession, and he 
may not defend his actions by contending that he was engaged in some other kind of professional 
activity.”). 
 34. See id. at 764. 
 35. MITTEN ET AL., TEACHER‟S MANUAL [FOR] SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 125 (2009). 
 36. Illinois State Bar Assoc., Op. No. 700 (Nov. 4, 1980); See also SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, 
supra note 2. 
 37. See Illinois Opinion, supra note 36. 
 38. Supra note 2. 
7
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question of whether non-attorney agents are regularly engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.
39
  The authors first raise the issue of 
conflicts of interest, because it has been argued that the ethical rules 
governing conflicts for attorney-agents give an advantage to non-
attorney agents who (if successful) frequently represent multiple athletes 
with adverse interests (for example, competing for the same 
endorsement opportunities or, if the athletes are on the same team, the 
same salary pool (under a league-imposed salary cap)).
40
  Shropshire and 
Davis argue that the standards binding attorney-agents and non-attorney 




Turning to the two-hat theory, whereby attorney-agents might try to 
“disavow their attorney status” in their role as sports agents, Shropshire 
and Davis do not “draw any definitive conclusions”—negotiation of 
contracts is a traditional legal service, but agents offer non-legal 
services, including accounting and business planning.
42
  Nevertheless, 
 
 39. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 97-106. 
 40. Id. at 97-100; see also Mark Doman, Attorneys as Athlete-Agents: Reconciling the ABA 
Rules of Professional Conduct with the Practice of Athlete Representation, 5 TEX. REV. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 37, 51-55 (2003).  Doman also considers agent conflicts of interest due to concurrently 
representing a player and (i) management, (ii) corporate clients, (iii) the agent‟s parent company, 
and (iv) his own interests.  See id. at 55-65; see also Jamie E. Brown, The Battle the Fans Never 
See: Conflicts of Interest for Sports Lawyers, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813, 816-22 (discussing 
conflicts of interest arising from multiple client-athletes, including competition between players in 
the same draft class and limitations on endorsement opportunities, as well as conflicts arising from 
representing both players and coaches or both players and their union). 
This phenomenon also recurs in the representation of entertainers: 
Some experts in the entertainment business believe that conflicts of interest are 
beneficial.  For example, if an entertainment lawyer represents a successful producer and 
a famous actor and unites them, as some agents do, in a package deal, that combination 
can produce a box office hit.  Everyone wins.  The risk, however, is that lawyers may 
protect their special relationship with the studio and others via package deals that 
promote more prominent clients at the expense of the less famous (and less profitable) 
clients. 
Kenneth J. Aldo & Jack P. Sahl, A Professional Responsibility Primer for Today‟s Entertainment 
Lawyer, 18 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 4 (2000). 
 41. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 97-98. Doman, supra note 40, at 51-65, also 
concedes the restriction on conflicts of interest in league/union regulations, but argues that they are 
weakly enforced.  See also Brown, supra note 40, at 824-31 (discussing agency law regarding 
conflicts of interest and comparing it with ethical rules for lawyers); 831-34 (stating that regulatory 
schemes for sports agents are more vague, with respect to conflicts of interest, than the ethical rules 
for lawyers, and often fail to protect athlete clients). 
 42. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 100-01. 
[In the entertainment industry, some] attorneys argue that when acting as an agent or 
manager, they are not subject to the codes of professional conduct.  This approach 
carries some risk, because lawyers‟ professional liability policies may not cover all of 
their services.  Other attorneys formally establish separate businesses that render 
8
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numerous legal authorities suggest that attorneys offering services that 
are related to the practice of law will be judged under the rules of 
professional conduct.
43
  But the inquiry continues—what about attorneys 
who do not hold themselves out as attorneys, or do not practice law apart 
from their sports representation, or do not get licensed after law school, 
particularly if they “[provide] services that involve those traditionally 
considered to involve the practice of law (for example, contract review 
and negotiation) . . . ?”44   Can such individuals avoid attorney ethics, or 
(if unlicensed or outside their bar‟s jurisdiction) avoid the unauthorized 
practice of law?  Such questions “defy easy resolution,” because “the 
practice of law” is difficult to define.45  Shropshire and Davis cite cases 
involving licensed attorneys outside their jurisdiction, wherein the 
practice of law is defined as engaging in activities requiring “legal 
knowledge, training, skill, and ability”46 and “legal advice and legal 
instrument . . . preparation.”47  But these cases involving attorneys seem 
to deflect the bigger question raised by the authors but left unanswered, 
namely whether non-attorney agents are practicing law.  That question, 
seemingly unrelated to the problems attorney-agents face in their 
competition with non-attorney agents, points to a realistic solution for 
those problems.  
B. Proposed Solutions  
I have not discussed some of the other problems attributed to 
athlete and celebrity representation by non-attorneys (which have been 
identified by others and provide the backdrop for the various proposed 
solutions to the dilemmas of attorney-agents), including a history of 
 
financial or career advice or solicit employment [for entertainment industry clients].  
They may incorporate the businesses and employ full-time personnel, but these 
businesses must not provide legal services.  
Lawyers must be very careful when creating separate businesses to ensure that these are 
not used to circumvent the lawyer‟s ethical obligations.  As long as attorneys are 
licensed to practice law, they are subject to state codes of professional conduct for even 
their nonprofessional activities. 
Abdo & Sahl, supra note 40, at 6. 
 43. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 101-03. 
 44. See id. at 104. 
 45. Id. at 104. 
 46. See id. at 104 (citing In re: Application of Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103, 1106 (N.J. 2000) 
(citing State v. Rogers, 705 A.2d 397 (N.J. Super. 1998))).  
 47. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 104-05 (citing Birbrower, Montelbano, 
Condon, & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1998) (citing 
People ex rel. Lawyers‟ Institute of San Diego v. Merchants Protective Corp, 209 P. 363 (Cal. 
1922))). 
9
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unscrupulous behavior by many sports and entertainment agents, the 
seeming ineffectiveness of existing state and league or union regulations 
to curtail such behavior, and the fact that anyone can apparently become 
an athlete or celebrity agent without regard to qualifications because the 
profession is so ill-defined.
48
  Proposed solutions include (i) more and 
better regulation, especially ethical regulation, of non-attorney agents,
49
 
(ii) lower ethical standards for attorney-agents,
50
 and (iii) requiring all 
sports agents to be law school graduates.
51
  All have merit—the first, by 
keeping attorney ethics strong and transferring those principles to the 
profession of non-attorney agents, addresses most of the ethical 
problems identified in the discourse of sports representation; the second 
at least solves the problem of the competitive disadvantage of attorney-
agents; and the third seems to solve the problem of unqualified and 
abusive agents by eliminating the competition problem.  All have 
weaknesses—the first is complex and unwieldy, insofar as it could go in 
many directions and face opposition on many fronts, and it does not 
address the problems of unauthorized practice of law or the 
qualifications of agents; the second solves the competition problem at 
great cost to attorney ethics and assumes that the competitive 
disadvantage is the major problem; and the third is unrealistic given that 
there are many services offered by agents that do not involve the practice 
of law—in my experience, agents often have marketing skills and 
financial planning skills that many attorneys do not possess.  But 
borrowing from the intent of the first and second solutions (to ensure 
quality representation of athletes and celebrities), and honoring the 
principle behind the third solution that only attorneys should be 
practicing law, I believe the focus of any solution should be on the 
unauthorized practice of law by non-attorney agents, which is a far more 
conventional legal idea that will only be rendered unrealistic by 
conventional understandings and practices in the field of sports and 
entertainment law. 
 
 48. See generally Geisel, supra note 8; Doman, supra note 40.  
 49. See, e.g., Doman, supra note 40.  
 50. See, e.g., Geisel, supra note 8.  
 51. See, e.g., Brian Charles Lea, Sports are Big Business, So Stop Playing Games: Why 
Federal Regulation Should Require Every Sports Agent to Possess a J.D. 49 (unpublished 
manuscript available at http://works.bepress.com/brian_lea/1/). 
10
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III. CONVENTIONS 
The definitions and tests employed by courts to delineate unauthorized 
practice by nonlawyers have been vague or conclusory, while 
jurisdictions have differed significantly in describing what constitutes 
unauthorized practice [of law] . . . . 
 
Controversy has surrounded many out-of-court activities such as 
advising on estate planning by bank trust officers . . . [or] insurance 
agents, . . . [and] providing guidance on forms for property transactions 
by real-estate agents . . . .  Several jurisdictions recognize that many 
such services can be provided by nonlawyers without significant risk 
of incompetent service . . . .
52
 
According to the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers, 
“unauthorized practice restrictions have lessened . . . in most 
jurisdictions,” and while a few still enforce “traditional restraints . . . 
through active programs,” others have “effectively ceased” 
enforcement.
53
  A major argument in favor of allowing non-lawyers to 
perform traditional legal services is that:  
persons in need of legal services may be significantly aided in 
obtaining assistance at a much lower price than would be entailed by 
segregating out a portion of the transaction to be handled by a lawyer 
for a fee, and that many persons can ill afford, and most persons are at 
least inconvenienced by, the typically high cost of lawyer services.
54
 
Moreover, “traditional common-law and statutory consumer-protection 
measures offer significant protection to consumers of such nonlawyer 
services.”55   
To the extent that non-attorney sports and entertainment agents 
provide traditional legal services alongside non-legal services, an 
argument can be made that agency law, state regulatory schemes for 
athlete agents, and league or union regulations offer significant 
protection to clients.
56
  On the other hand, while the lessening of 
 
 52. RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c. (2000).  
 53. Id. at § 4 cmt. b.  
 54. Id. at § 4 cmt. c.  
 55. Id. 
 56. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 97-98:  
General agency law principles, as well as those that govern the practice of law, impose 
duties on both attorney agents and nonattorney agents.  Examples of such duties include 
requirements that services be rendered competently and that clients be represented with 
the utmost loyalty and good faith. 
11
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unauthorized practice restrictions is justified by the “actual experience in 
several states with extensive nonlawyer provision of traditional legal 
services indicat[ing] no significant risk of harm to consumers of such 
services,”57  the history of sports and entertainment representation offers 
many examples of agent misconduct and abuse.
58
  And although many 
athletes struggle to break into the ranks of professional sports, those who 
manage to break in are typically not considered needy.  Therefore, the 
field of sports representation seems to be especially well-suited as an 
area for enforcement of unauthorized practice restrictions. 
A strange formal ethics opinion from Arizona in 1999 provides 
insight into the debate over unauthorized practice of law by non-attorney 
agents.
59
  The questions presented included whether an attorney 
representing an insurer may negotiate with a non-attorney “public 
adjuster” who negotiates settlement of claims on behalf of insureds.60 
Arizona ethical rules clearly prohibit communication with a party 
represented by a lawyer, clearly allow contact with a party not 
represented by a lawyer, and clearly prohibit assisting “a person who is 
not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes 
the unauthorized practice of law.”61  Since the practice of law has been 
defined in Arizona as including negotiation of a contract, and law 
practice requires bar membership, the committee concluded that 
negotiating with a non-attorney “public adjuster” would be aiding in the 
unauthorized practice of law.
62
  However, an Arizona statute permits 
non-lawyer adjusters to negotiate settlement of insurance claims, 
apparently permitting “nonlawyers to engage in what would otherwise 
be the practice of law.”63  Struggling with the impact of that statute “in 
the ongoing debate about what constitutes the unauthorized practice of 
law,” the committee was forced to recognize the category of 
“authorized” practice of law by non-lawyers.64   Nevertheless, lawyers 
 
Id.  See also CARFAGNA, supra note 13, at 1-9 (discussing fiduciary duty under agency law, civil 
and criminal liability for mismanagement of funds, and state regulation of athlete-agents).  
 57. RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c. (2000). 
 58. See generally Craig Neff, Den of Vipers, A Sports Scourge: Bad Agents, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 76; CARFAGNA, supra note 13, at 1-7, 9. 
 59. See Arizona State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. No, 99-07. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. (citing ARIZONA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RR. 4.2, 4.3, & 5.5). 
 62. See Arizona State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. No, 99-07 (citing In re Fleischman, 188 Ariz. 
106, 933 P.2d 563 (1977) (advising about legal rights and negotiation of a contract are examples of 
practicing law) and ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 31(a)(3) & 33(c) (practice of law requires bar admission)).  
 63. Arizona State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. No, 99-07, citing ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 20-281. 
 64. See Arizona opinion, supra note 59.  But see REST., supra note 52, § 4 cmt. a 
(unauthorized practice of law “is well understood not to imply any necessary area of permissible 
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must follow the state supreme court‟s ethical guidelines; so, just as it 
would be wrong to assist in the unauthorized practice of law by 




One of the two dissenters on the committee questioned both (i) 
whether the definition of law practice as including negotiation of a 
contract (from a case involving wrongful law practice by a judge) should 
be read so broadly to imply that a non-lawyer who negotiates a contract 
for another is necessarily practicing law, 
66
 and (ii) whether the term 
“assist” should be read so broadly as to include negotiation with a non-
lawyer (as opposed to cooperation or affirmative aid of some kind, as 
“where a lawyer has a business relationship with a nonlawyer engaged in 
unauthorized practice”).67   Most importantly, with a valid statute on the 
books authorizing public adjusters to negotiate settlements, it seems 
absurd to treat their practice as unauthorized under Arizona Supreme 
Court rules: 
The Committee majority‟s conclusion has immense implications.  If 
negotiating an agreement for another is “the practice of law,” then real 
estate brokers, sports agents, and accountants (to name only a few of 
the most obvious examples) are “practicing law.”  The Committee‟s . . 
 
practice by a nonlawyer,” other than pro se representation).  The Arizona ethics committee noted (i) 
that other states have found insurance adjustors to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
(and struck down licensing statutes allowing adjusters to negotiate settlements), see Arizona 
opinion, supra note 59 (citing Prof. Adjusters Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1982) and 
Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936)), and (ii) that one state made a distinction between 
independent adjusters who engage in the unauthorized practice of law and adjusters hired by 
insurance companies who are supervised by insurance counsel, see Arizona opinion, supra note 59, 
(citing Rhode Island Bar Assn. v. Lesser, 68 R.I. 14, 26 A.2d 6 (1942)).  
 65. See Arizona State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. No, 99-07.  
 66. See Arizona State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. No, 99-07 (Dissent #1) (quoting In re 
Fleischman, 188 Ariz. at 111: 
We find that respondent‟s effort and work [negotiating a contract for a client] constitute 
acts that are customarily performed . . . in the ordinary practice of members of the legal 
profession.  That they also may be performed in part or in whole by nonlawyers from 
time to time does not exclude them from the practice of law. 
Id.  This dissenter paraphrased this quote as follows: 
[N]ot every activity that is the „practice of law‟ for a lawyer...is reserved exclusively for 
lawyers,” see Arizona opinion (Dissent #1), supra, but the quote also is susceptible to the 
majority‟s interpretation, which might be paraphrased, “just because nonlawyers 
negotiate contracts does not mean that negotiating contracts is not the practice of law and 
therefore not unauthorized by non-lawyers. 
Id. 
 67. Arizona State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. No, 99-07 (Dissent #1), (“The ordinary meaning of 
the word „assist‟ is not so broad.  Ordinarily the word connotes cooperation or affirmative aid of 
some kind”).  
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. opinion would prevent a lawyer from negotiating on behalf of a client 
with any of those professions[—a] startling conclusion . . . .68  
For this dissenter, if there are incompetent or untrustworthy adjusters, 
the solution does not lie in unauthorized practice restrictions, but, like 
some of those who propose reforms to stop sports agent abuse, in more 
and better regulations: 
We believe that the appropriate authorities should act as soon as 
possible, to ensure that public adjusters do not give advice beyond 
their lay knowledge or treat their clients and adversaries unfairly or 
dishonestly.  The Legislature can amend [the public adjuster statute]; 




For two reasons, I do not agree that the conclusion of the committee 
majority is startling. 
First, in my experience as a sports attorney, I knew agents who 
were very good at signing clients, finding a team for a player, getting the 
best offer, marketing the player to obtain endorsement and appearance 
opportunities, and offering career counseling advice.  I also thought that 
the player needed an attorney to represent him in his contract with the 
agent, to advise him regarding the terms of his team-player contract, and 
to draft endorsement or appearance contracts.  I did not believe that a 
non-attorney agent should be drafting contracts or counseling the client 
on legal terms and their effects, especially since all of these contracts 
included payments to the non-attorney agent.
70
   Moreover, if the agent 
was not a competent financial advisor, I also believed that a player-client 
should have an independent financial advisor.
71
 
Second, the regulation of real estate agents to prevent the 
unauthorized practice of law is not unheard of, and not startling.  It is, 
however, controversial—a “battleground between lawyers, who want to 
be included in all transactions, and consumers, realtors, title companies, 
and lenders who would often prefer to handle transactions without the 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Likewise, if the athlete client was represented by an attorney-agent, I believed the player 
should have independent counsel with respect to all contracts that included terms of payment to the 
attorney agent.  See supra note 10.  
 71. See generally David S. Caudill, Revisiting the Ethics of Representing Professional 
Athletes: Agents, Attorney-Agents, Full-Service Agencies, and the Dream Team Model, 3 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 31 (2003-2004) (discussing the need for independent attorneys and 
independent financial advisors for athletes represented by non-attorney agents and, in some cases, 
attorney-agents). 
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added expense of a lawyer.”72  Although prosecutions for the 
unauthorized practice of law are generally in decline,
73
 the debate over 
alleged unauthorized practice by realtors is alive and nationally 
prominent.
74
  States can require that all real estate documents are 
prepared by lawyers, allow all real estate documents to be prepared by 
non-lawyers, or allow some documents to be prepared by non-lawyers 
(e.g., preliminary documents or standard contracts) but not others (e.g., 
mortgages and deeds).
75
  Those states that aggressively pursue 
unauthorized practitioners are often seen as protectionist regarding the 
legal profession and paternalistic toward the public; in that view, 
competency should be the concern,
76
 and non-lawyer specialists may be 
more competent for some transactions than generalist lawyers.
77
  
Moreover, protectionist measures seem to ignore the unmet legal needs 
of the poor,
78
 and they draw the attention of the Federal Trade 
 
 72. George C. Leef, „UPL‟ Lawyer Welfare Revisited, REGULATION, Winter 2002-2003, at 8. 
 73. See Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law:  An Overview 
of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2585 (1999); see also Pamela A. 
McManus, Have License; Will Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL. ETHICS 527, 540-42 (2002) (arguing that 
UPL laws are selectively enforced, citing Cape May County Bar Assoc. v. Ludlam, 211 A.2d 780, 
782 (N.J. 1965) (layman who prepares mortgages is engaged in UPL) and Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N. 
E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1965) (drafting a simple legal document for a small fee is not UPL)).  Income 
tax preparers, certified public accountants, and even stock brokers and financial planners, as well as 
real estate agents, obviously deal in legal matters and documents; Colorado allows lay agents to 
represent clients in employment hearings.  See id.; see also In. re: Opinion No. 26 of Comm‟n on 
Unauth. Pract. L., 654 A.2d 1344, 1359 (N.J. 1995) (holding that, if parties are aware of risks and 
potential conflicts of interest, then closing a real estate transaction is allowed even if it is an 
example of the unauthorized practice of law). 
 74. See Tara Austin, Legal Professionalism:  Doe v. McMaster and the Lawyer‟s Role in Real 
Estate Transactions, 55 S.C. L. REV. 591, 591 (2004). 
 75. See Comment, Too Many Hands in the Cookie Jar: The Unauthorized Practice of Law by 
Real Estate Brokers, 75 OR. L. REV. 889, 902-09 (1996).  While almost every court would prohibit 
brokers from giving legal advice, the term “legal advice” is difficult to define.  See id. at 911-12.  
See generally Margaret Onys Rentz, Note, Laying Down the Law: Bringing Down the Legal Cartel 
in Real Estate Settlement Services and Beyond, 40 GA. L. REV. 293, 311-16 (2005) (survey of 
various state approaches).  See also ABA 2009 Survey of Unlicensed Practice of Law Committees, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/combined-charts.pdf (results of ABA Standing 
Committee of Client Protection survey on unlicensed practice of law). 
 76. See McManus, supra note 73, at 552.  See also Joyce Palomar, The War Between 
Attorneys and Realtors:  Empirical Evidence Says „Cease Fire?‟, 31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 508 (1998) 
(empirical evidence shows very little difference in error rates between states requiring lawyers at 
real estate closings and states where closings are done without a lawyer).  As to paternalism, the 
public may not want strong UPL prohibitions.  See Denckla, supra note 73, at 2596. 
 77. See Denckla, supra note 73, at 2594.  Also, lawyers do not have an “exclusive claim to 
integrity.”  See id. 
 78. See id. at 2595; see also Alan Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law:  
Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question, 4 NOVA L. REV. 363, 367 (1980). 
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Commission and the Department of Justice‟s Antitrust Division because 
of the potential financial burdens and lack of choice for consumers.
79
 
The Virginia State Bar guidelines for real estate settlement agents 
allow non-attorney agents to complete form documents “selected by and 
in accordance with the instructions of the parties to the transaction,” but 
not to draft or select (“if to do so requires the exercise of legal 
judgment”) such documents.80  Non-attorney agents may not give legal 
advice; giving legal advice, or creating or drafting a legal document, is 
the practice of law.
81
  
Defining what is “legal advice” is difficult; however, examples . . . 
include: explaining . . . legal obligations . . . ; explaining the meaning 
of legal terms . . . ; drafting legal instruments . . . ; providing legal 
opinions in response to the following types of questions: a. “What 
should I do?” [;] b. “What are my rights and obligations under this 
document?” [;] “What are the lender‟s rights and obligations under this 
document?”82 
The analogy between real estate agents and non-attorney sports agents 
is, in my experience, a strong one.  Non-attorney sports agents may 
complete form documents, like the standard NFL team-player contract, 
but they should not be drafting legal documents or giving legal advice. 
Targeting the specific practices of real estate agents is a virtue of 
Virginia‟s guidelines.83  For example, in late 2007, the Hawaii State Bar 
Association proposed to the Hawaii Supreme Court a broad ban on the 
unauthorized practice of law—defining the practice of law as including 
“selecting, drafting or completing documents that affect the legal rights 
of another person or entity.”84  However, even the state attorney general 
thought that it was too broad,
85
 and opposition from the insurance 
industry, realtors, accountants, and do-it-yourself legal service providers 
 
 79. See Leef, supra note 72.  See, e.g., Letter from Federal Trade Commission to the 
Executive Director of the Virginia State Bar, Sept. 20, 1996, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/0886.pdf  (letter was prompted by the proposal in 
Virginia UPL Opinion no. 183 (1996) to require lawyers to conduct real estate closings). 
 80. See Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) Guidelines for Real Estate Settlement Agents, 
available at http://www.vsb.org/site/regulation/upl-guidelines-for-real-estate-settlement-agents. 
Agents likewise cannot draft deeds, deeds of trust, deed of trust notes, or deeds of release.  See id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
 83. See Letter from Federal Trade Commission, supra note 79. 
 84. Ken Kobayashi, Justices Consider Legal Aid Proposal, STAR-BULLETIN, vol. 13, issue 21 
(Jan. 21, 2008) (citing a proposed rule on unauthorized practice of law) available at 
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2008/01/21/news/story02.html.   
 85. Jeffrey Sia, Clarifying Rules on the Unauthorized Practice of Law,  PAC. BUS. NEWS, Feb. 
13, 2009, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2009/02/16/editorial2.html. 
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was immediate.
86
 The debate over the proposal has continued, and the 
latest version of the rule is so full of exceptions (especially for realtors) 
that its effectiveness is in question.
87
  After all, one of the major 
justifications for allowing non-lawyer legal service providers is that they 
provide a public service to those who would otherwise not use or be able 
to afford attorneys.
88
  While a narrower and less ambiguous regulation 
targeted at non-attorney sports and entertainment agents would certainly 
face opposition, the specific practices of agents would be openly 
discussed, and their clients would generally not be poor—well, maybe 
musicians, but not professional athletes.  It would be hard, I believe, to 
argue that non-attorney agents should be drafting contracts and offering 
legal advice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Most athletes are understandably more comfortable letting agents 
negotiate their contracts.  A good and trustworthy agent can reasonably 
be expected to get a better deal than the average athlete, especially the 
youngest and least savvy . . . .  Yet somewhere along the way the 
cavalry that rescued the athletes turned on them—or a good part of the 
cavalry did, anyway.  “The reason we had to have agents in the first 
place was to protect the players from owners,” says Harvard law 
professor Paul Weiler . . . “The problem we have now is how to protect 
the player from the agent.  In a sense we‟ve just pushed the problem 
back one stage.”89  
Proposals to solve that problem, of how to ensure competent and 
trustworthy representation of athletes and celebrities, include (i) more 
and better regulation,
90
 (ii) relaxation of attorney ethics so that attorney-
agents can compete with non-attorney agents,
91
 (iii) requiring all agents 
 
 86. See Kobayashi, supra note 84. 
 87. See Sia, supra note 85.  A revised version of the rule was proposed following the October 
23, 2008, meeting of the Hawaii State Bar Association after a “long and thoughtful dialogue with 
representatives of accountants, insurance companies, real estate agents, paralegals, automobile 
dealers . . . and others.” Id. The revised rule had eighteen exemptions, including one for realtors that 
exempted negotiating and preparing real estate agreements, as well as providing advice regarding 
those agreements.  Id.  A bill was also proposed in the Hawaii Senate, and opposed by the state bar, 
providing that licensed real estate brokers will not be deemed to be engaged in the practice of law 
when providing services for which their license is required.  See S.B. 1219 (Haw. 2009) (deferred 
until next session). 
 88. See generally Denckla, supra note 73, at 2595. 
 89. Neff, supra note 58, at 76.  
 90. See Doman, supra note 40. 
 91. See Geisel, supra note 8. 
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to be law graduates,
92
 and even (iv) deregulation of the sports agent 
business.
93
  The current focus on ethical dilemmas and the need for more 
regulation often eclipses the problem of the unauthorized practice of 
law.  However, solving the problem of sports and entertainment agents 
with restrictions on law practice is a much more conventional solution—
it is only rendered unrealistic by the conventions of the field of sports 
and entertainment representation. 
 
 
 92. See Lea, supra note 51. 
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